>If our experiences are purely an informational process
Well, that might be true, but it's hard to prove because we don't have direct access to other entity's experiences ... or access to pure information that exists without a material substrate. It's suggestive that an information space has the same structure as a qualia space, but predicting that an information space would necessarily feel like qualia from the inside is a taller order.
>I think a consciousness simulated on a rock computer would actually be conscious and have subjective experiences. This still sounds ludicrous, but now I think I can see in what sense this would actually be true. A simulated experience is real because its informational underpinnings are real.
But what does the information mean? What does 100101010001110001 mean? Well, many people would say that the meaning comes from.some physical connectivity...but then the meaning isn't in the pure information.
> Well, that might be true, but it's hard to prove
I agree, this seems hard to prove, and even harder to conclusively rule out other outside influences.
> But what does the information mean? What does 100101010001110001 mean? Well, many people would say that the meaning comes from.some physical connectivity...but then the meaning isn't in the pure information.
Meaning in an embedding space comes from the self-consistent relationships between information within it. The specifics, like 100101010001110001 or any other representation, don't really matter as long as the relationships between information are preserved. The physical connectivity you mention is the ultimate source of truth for determining these relationships.
For example, cat and gato are references to the same information, but the meaning of these words are encoded using different embedding spaces. It doesn't matter what symbols we use to represent the words "cats" "like" and "fish", so long as the relationship between these symbols can be consistently interpreted to mean cats enjoy eating fish.
I'm reading Hofstadter right now, and now he seems to pop up all the time. Enjoyed seeing lots of ideas I've seen elsewhere put together
philosophy is just a bland form of mythology: boring metaphors, lots of boring words
>If our experiences are purely an informational process
Well, that might be true, but it's hard to prove because we don't have direct access to other entity's experiences ... or access to pure information that exists without a material substrate. It's suggestive that an information space has the same structure as a qualia space, but predicting that an information space would necessarily feel like qualia from the inside is a taller order.
>I think a consciousness simulated on a rock computer would actually be conscious and have subjective experiences. This still sounds ludicrous, but now I think I can see in what sense this would actually be true. A simulated experience is real because its informational underpinnings are real.
But what does the information mean? What does 100101010001110001 mean? Well, many people would say that the meaning comes from.some physical connectivity...but then the meaning isn't in the pure information.
> Well, that might be true, but it's hard to prove
I agree, this seems hard to prove, and even harder to conclusively rule out other outside influences.
> But what does the information mean? What does 100101010001110001 mean? Well, many people would say that the meaning comes from.some physical connectivity...but then the meaning isn't in the pure information.
Meaning in an embedding space comes from the self-consistent relationships between information within it. The specifics, like 100101010001110001 or any other representation, don't really matter as long as the relationships between information are preserved. The physical connectivity you mention is the ultimate source of truth for determining these relationships.
For example, cat and gato are references to the same information, but the meaning of these words are encoded using different embedding spaces. It doesn't matter what symbols we use to represent the words "cats" "like" and "fish", so long as the relationship between these symbols can be consistently interpreted to mean cats enjoy eating fish.